

stand and appreciate the Narrative, it is necessary to lay aside the office of critic, and realise the condition of the author, whose whole mind seems to be filled with the subject of slavery and its victims, whether slaves, overseers, or slaveholders. Only in this way can the writer be forgiven his occasionally elaborate portraits of individuals having nothing about them worthy of notice, save their almost incredible brutality. But even as a literary production, this book possesses no ordinary claims. The author, though uneducated, or rather self-educated, displays great natural powers; he utters his thoughts always lucidly, and often with a polished and vigorous eloquence. Indeed the book convinces us, and must convince any impartial reader, that the argument, if it can be so termed, which would uphold slavery on the ground of the slaves' natural inferiority, has no foundation as regards such men as the writer, and therefore totally fails in its general application.

Where there is so much to interest the reader and excite the philanthropist—now with pain at human suffering from inhuman oppression, and now with hopefulness that that suffering, and the causes of it, promise to be speedily removed, we can only afford space for a striking extract, which the author exhibits his style and power as a writer, while accounting for and refuting the pro-slavery assertion of the contentedness of the poor African under his bondage.

FESTIVAL AT THE TEMPERANCE INSTITUTE.—Tuesday Evening, the Rev. Mr. Mathew and the members of the Institute held a Festival. It was given to compliment Mr. Douglass, the American Slave, and eloquent denouncer of African Slavery. There were upwards of 200 ladies and gentlemen present. The decorations of the room were admirable and picturesque, and the supply of confectionery and fruit most tempting and abundant. When Mr. Douglass was introduced by the Rev. President, he was received with great applause. He addressed the assembly with his usual animation and eloquence on the subject of Slavery, and the great beneficial effects of Temperance. His address was much cheered. Music and dancing were the concluding recreations of the evening, after which the company retired, highly delighted with the social and festive scene. —*Cork Examiner, Oct. 24.*

From the Arbroath Guide, Oct. 25.
MR. H. C. WRIGHT'S LETTER TO MESSRS. CHALMERS, CUNNINGHAM, AND CANDLISH.

It is with much satisfaction that we are enabled to announce that Mr. H. C. Wright of Philadelphia, whose lectures on Slavery, as it exists in the southern States of America, created no little sensation in Arbroath a few weeks ago, is soon to pay a visit. 'Free' Church men and 'Free' Church ministers will, in all probability, have some faint recollection of how Mr. Wright exposed the hypocrisy and sordid motives which led too many of the great-est of that Church to visit America, who, upon their return, with their pockets well lined with the slaveholders' dollars, and their carcases stuffed with the rich viands and the costly wines which figured at the slaveholders' tables, attempted to mislead us to the real position of the New-England slave, representing the one as the happiest, most comfortable and contented of beings, and the master as the most pious, amiable, generous, and kindest of men. The mastery itself in which Mr. Wright exposed the ministers of the Free Church, Evangelical Ministers par excellence, palliating, nay, vindicating Slavery, will not soon be forgotten. Keeping in view the old saying, however, of a good man being none the worse of being twice told, and bearing in mind that our Free Church friends' memories require to be refreshed occasionally, and they themselves roused from that state of self-like submission to their ministers, to which a sort of mesmeric priestcraft has reduced them, we hail Mr. Wright's return among us with much satisfaction.

We are not enabled to say as to the particular day on which that able, excellent, and fearless friend of the human race will arrive here, but sure are we that, as before, he will be listened to with deep interest, and that his philanthropic efforts to expose wilful misrepresentation and gross hypocrisy will be duly appreciated. To a letter from Mr. Wright, addressed to Messrs. Chalmers, Cunningham, and Candlish, in our columns of to-day, we beg to call particular attention.

From the London Inquirer of Oct. 18.
REV. DR. PARKMAN, OF AMERICA.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE INQUIRER:
DEAR SIR:—I am glad to find my remarks in the Inquirer of August the 30th, relative to Dr. Parkman, have not passed unnoticed. In your Number of the 27th Sept., I find that an anonymous writer has entered the field in defence of Dr. Parkman and Dr. Dewey; and I may fairly infer, of all those other Unitarian clergymen in America, who, by their criminal silence in their own country on the subject of slavery, are justly ranked by Abolitionists among the pro-slavery party. I do not wonder that 'Amicus' (what an excellent name for a defender of slavery!) taking the position he has done on this question, should shrink from giving his own name to the public. I do not like noticing names in regard to slavery in America, on the part of Unitarians in these kingdoms, is a matter of deep importance. I have in defence of Dr. Parkman, as briefly as possible, to the letter signed 'Amicus.' I am charged with making an impression 'unjust and injurious' with regard to some of our transatlantic friends. That I may have conveyed an impression injurious to them, in many minds, I do not deny; my intention was to do so—in so far as letting the Unitarians of these countries know something of their pro-slavery feelings would be an injury to their moral character at this side of the Atlantic. But that was unjust, I cannot admit; and I think the whole tenor of Amicus's letter goes to prove, as far as the reasoning of an advocate may be taken, as the argument of his principle, that I did no more than state plain justice in putting Dr. Parkman down as the extenuator of slavery as it now exists in America, if he be not an absolute pro-slavery man. And 'Amicus' forces me to place him in the same category. It is true that they, both of them, deny this imputation; but let us inquire how far they deserve to be exempted from it. Dr. Parkman, when at home, preserves a cautious silence on the question of slavery; he carefully avoids all intercourse with those who declare that the man who turns a fellow-creature into a chattel—who supports a system of disgusting licentiousness, by tearing asunder the marriage tie at pleasure—who advocates a practice that endures the most merciless punishments—who declares, by his acts, that human beings must be kept forever in a state of brutal ignorance—and that the man who would help the negro to cultivate the intellect which God has given him, is worthy of death—for this is the law in some of the States—who upholds the horrid practice of breeding, and selling, for sale, as we breed the brute creation—who tells the men who are guilty of these, and a thousand other atrocious acts, that they are sinners, and not Christians at all. Dr. Parkman not only keeps aloof from the men who denounce these crimes; but he repudiates all connection with them. They bear that hated name, Abolitionist, and let us leave nothing to do with them: he condemns their conduct in life, and he adopts no means for 'undoing the heavy burden, and letting the oppressed go free,' for knocking off the chains from three millions of his fellow-men, save the dry preaching, in his pulpit, of an abstract Christianity. I ask the Unitarians of Great Britain and Ireland, if ministers who act thus coolly on the subject of human rights in America, a subject which is shaking the foundations of society in that land, are in the performance of their duty; or whether they deserve the name of faithful teachers of the doctrines of our Savior? So much for Dr. Parkman's title to be considered as a friend of the emancipation of his colored brethren. I need hardly adduce proof that 'Amicus' deserves the title just as little. His own letter condemns him. He talks against the 'great iniquity' of slavery, but he puts off its abolition forever; for he tells us that America has 'neither the power nor the inclination' to pay the price which our Government paid to the West India planters. That 'pecuniary effort' was an act of shameless plunder upon the people of these countries. 'Amicus' may rest assured that all men, who like himself, Dr. Parkman and Dr. Dewey, throw a veil over the iniquities of slave-

holding—who palliate the acts of man-stealers—who talk of their system being 'bound up in property,' and who extend the hand of Christian fellowship to their best supporters, will be considered by them as their best supporters. The only difference between two opinions on this matter, is that an Abolitionist, that is, a man who insists on the right of all his brethren to immediate and unqualified freedom, must be a pro-slavery man; for he is willing to rob his brother of his rights, and he strives to stifle his own conscientious convictions by professing that he is to do justly and love mercy 'at a more convenient season.' I asked Dr. Parkman if his own child was carried away and sold as a slave, would he be silent, and would he give the hand of Christian fellowship to the robber? I ask 'Amicus' the same question; and if he be an honest man, he will act on the great question of human rights in accordance with the answer he has just given me. I accuse Dr. Parkman of being false to his own convictions in this respect. I accuse every Unitarian who does not hold with the Abolitionists, that slavery is a sin, and that every slaveholder is a sinner; of being false to his own convictions of truth and justice; and in the name of humanity—name of Christianity—in the name of all that men hold dear upon earth, I entreat the Unitarians of Great Britain and Ireland to sustain the purity of their high and noble profession, by declaring to their fellow professors in America their solemn determination not to recognise as Christian men, those who hold their brethren in slavery; or any who will profess that it is the duty of the master to make his slave lastingly free.

What does 'Amicus' mean by saying, 'Now, on this subject a vast deal of information is required which is not before us?' Surely we know that three millions of our fellow-men are held in slavery in America by men who speak the same language that we do, and who may be called our own countrymen, and whose relations are similar to our own—what more information do we need to teach us our duty? The Abolitionists only ask us to use lawful and moral means to assist them; they entreat us to bring the powerful force of enlightened public opinion to aid them in assisting to free their nation from the great evil which afflicts it, and which depresses the rising greatness of a people, whose institutions, in other respects, have much in them to challenge the admiration of the world. 'Amicus' must excuse my use of the word 'bamboozle'; for, although not a very elegant term, it is yet expressive, to convey an idea of the feelings of those Americans who talk to us of their 'peculiar institutions,' and of the necessity of our understanding 'exactly how they are situated in relation to slavery.' I can only characterise this as a mean and despicable course for them to pursue; it is a course evidently intended to soften the indignation of Europe, and make men, among us, who have not thought much on the subject of human rights, quiet their consciences by the conclusion, that they have talked over the matter with intelligent Americans, who acknowledge that slavery was an evil, but that, owing to peculiar circumstances, which Europeans did not, or could not, comprehend, no mode of abolishing it, that could be adopted, had not yet been proposed. It is a pitiful stratagem on their guard against such arguments as these, used by such men as Dr. Parkman and Dr. Dewey, that I have brought the subject before them. I am satisfied, if we act faithfully in this matter, if we prevent our minds from being biased by such sentiments because they proceed from learned men—from men held in high estimation by many; and we depart from the question of slavery and its abolition against cool, may be most excellent and worthy characters—if we stick steadily to the principles of truth and justice in our communications with such individuals as these, great good must be the result; for it is by the foolishness of preaching, by an unceasing operation on the consciences of slaveholders, by making them feel that they are despised, and by exciting their apprehensions about their condition in a future state, and not by force, or the operation of any merely political action, that the freedom of the slave is to be achieved. 'Amicus' has no faith in the value of this moral power, and he relies on the force of the arm, and the sword of inefficiency. I never read that work, but I doubt if such a sentiment could be found in any of the late writings of that eminent and noble-hearted man. I should repudiate it wherever found. The only plan of procedure in this matter I can offer for the consideration of 'American statesmen' is, the Christian plan of 'doing unto others as they would have us do unto them.' If we do as well as we can as a just mode of action in the case of slavery. Does 'Amicus' imagine that the slaveholder, who holds his slaves, is to be assisted in abolishing slavery, which I look upon as a crime of such enormous magnitude, that all other crimes pale before it. It seems to me an impious attempt to fetter the Almighty; for it is the spirit of the Almighty in the soul of man which elevates us above the brute creation.

'Amicus' quotes that text of Scripture, 'Judge not, as ye would not be judged, nor judge ye harshly, but to attribute bad motives when the actions of men allow me, or warrant me, in attributing good ones, I agree with him in the propriety of his quotation; but if he means that I am not to judge, I do not concur. I have a right to judge, and I do judge. If by this he means that I am not to judge harshly, but to attribute bad motives when the actions of men allow me, or warrant me, in attributing good ones, I agree with him in the propriety of his quotation; but if he means that I am not to judge, I do not concur. I have a right to judge, and I do judge. If by this he means that I am not to judge harshly, but to attribute bad motives when the actions of men allow me, or warrant me, in attributing good ones, I agree with him in the propriety of his quotation; but if he means that I am not to judge, I do not concur. I have a right to judge, and I do judge. 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TO OUR DELINQUENT SUBSCRIBERS.

We this week forward bills to all who have not paid for the present volume, as well as to those who are in arrears for a longer term.

As experience has proved the advantage of discontinuing, at the commencement of each year, all such papers as remain for more than a year unpaid; it is hoped that all subscribers who find themselves occupying such a position, will send us the amounts due without delay; and it is desirable that all who receive bills, by way of remembrance, should favor us with a remittance as soon as convenient, that our bills for the year may not remain unpaid on the first of January.

Direct remittances to the General Agent.

The balance of the edition of Ralph Waldo Emerson's Address on W. I. Emancipation, delivered on the first of August, at Concord, will be sold at the Anti-Slavery Office for distribution, at the low price of seventy-five cents per dozen.

☐ A reply to the communication of our friend Alfred Wells is unavoidably deferred.

☐ The Protest against the exclusion of colored persons from the New Bedford Lyceum, in the preceding page, is an excellent document.

ADELPHIC LION LIBRARY ASSOCIATION.

The Lecture on Tuesday evening, Dec. 2d, at Ritchie Hall, will be delivered by William Lloyd Garrison.

Arrangements have been made for Lectures on succeeding Tuesday evenings, from the following gentlemen, viz :

Rev. Theodore Parker,	Henry B. Stanton, Esq.,
Wm. A. Chapin,	James McCune Smith,
Wendell Phillips, Esq.,	M. D., of New-York,
S. P. Andrews, Esq.,	Edward Young, Esq.,
Thomas Paul,	Henry Clapp, Jr.

Tickets at 75 cents each, admitting a Gentleman and Lady, may be obtained at the Bookstore of B. H. Greene, 124 Washington-street, and at No. 35 and 7 Cornhill, as also of the Committee.

WILLIAM C. NELL,
EDWARD B. LAWTON,
CHRISTOPHER R. WEEDEN,
CHARLES A. BATTISTE,
THOMAS COLE,
JOHN S. JACOBS,
HENRY WEEDEN,
ALFRED G. HOWARD,

Lecture
Committee.

Exercises to commence precisely at 7-1-2 o'clock.
Boston, Nov. 21, 1845.

WALKER AND MOODY

Will lecture at the following times and places on the claims of the American slave, the guilt of Northern and Southern slaveholders, and the duties of American freemen. Every true lover of liberty will feel it a privilege to give them a hospitable reception, and to contribute in every possible way to the success of their mission.

Friday,	Nov. 28,	Leicester.
Saturday,	" 29,	North Brookfield.
Sunday,	" 30,	West Brookfield.
Tuesday,	Dec. 2,	Warren.

WENDELL PHILLIPS,
General Agent.

ANTI-SLAVERY LECTURES IN FALL RIVER.

A course of Lectures will be delivered by request of the Anti-Slavery Sewing Circle of this place, in the Berean Temple—as follows :

CHARLES L. REMOND, Nov. 25th.
Mr. W. H. CHANNING, of New York, Friday,
Dec. 12.

REV. CALVIN STETSON, of Medford, Friday, Dec. 19.
JOSEPH W. BROWN, Esq., of Boston, Friday, Jan. 2.
PARKER PILLSBURY, Jan. 9th.

ALL persons are respectfully invited to attend the

meetings.

S. S. BUFFINGTON, Sec'y,
Fall River, Nov. 7th, 1845.

ANTI-SLAVERY MEETING IN UPTON.

The annual meeting of the Worcester Co. South Division Anti-Slavery Society will be held in Upton, DAY, Dec. 10, at 10 o'clock A. M., in connexion with the above, a Convention will be held for free discussion on the subject of slavery and anti-slavery, to continue through Wednesday and Thursday, the 10th and 11th, to which a general attendance of all persons feeling any interest in the common cause is respectfully invited. Speakers from any place may be expected.

J. M. FISK,
President.

November 26, 1845.

[?] Tables will be furnished in Union Hall with refreshments and other articles for sale, in aid of the cause. Individuals in the neighboring towns, desirous of contributing, are invited to remit to the care of Mrs. Holly D. Braden or Mr. Lydia R. Aldridge.

WINDHOM COUNTY ANTI-SLAVERY MEETING.

The friends of the slave, with the enemies of Texas annexation, will hold a meeting in the village of Plainfield, on Wednesday, Dec. 3d, 1845, commencing at 10 o'clock, A. M., and continuing through the afternoon and evening. Let us have a large meeting to give expression to the sentiment of the county of the unholy and robber project of Texas annexation, and the fiendish system of American slavery.

Distinguished speakers from abroad will attend the meeting.

L. L. BULLOCK, Secy.
Rev. Sec. W. Co. A. S. S.

NEW-ENGLAND TRUSS MANUFACTORY.

[?] The subscriber continues to manufacture Trusses of every description, at his residence at the old stand, opposite 264, No. 305 Washington-street, Boston, where he solicits orders, who call and visit individuals can see him alone, at any time, at the above place.

Having had twenty years' experience, he has afforded relief to three thousand persons for the last five years. And he trusts that no one who call and try Trusses of his manufacture. He is now confident he can give every individual relief who may call on him.

[?] The public are cautioned against the many cheap imitations which they cannot perform.

Having worn the different kinds of Trusses, more or less, that have been offered to the public for the last twenty years, from different patent manufacturers, and now continues to wear those of his own manufacture, he is now able to decide, after examining the rupture, what sort of Truss is best adapted to all the cases that occur; and he has on hand as good Trusses, and will furnish any kind of Truss that can be had elsewhere.

[?] J. F. manufactures as many as twenty different kinds of Trusses, among which are all the different kinds similar to those the late Mr. John Beach of this city formerly made, and all others advertised in Boston, together with the patent solid spring Truss, with spring pads. Trusses without steel—these give relief in all cases of rupture, and a large portion produce a perfect cure. They can be worn day and night. Improved hinge and pivot Truss; umbilical and spring Truss; and, in fact, all the various kinds of Trusses, and socket joints. Trusses for Prolapsus Ani, by wearing which persons troubled with a descent of the rectum can ride on horse-back with perfect ease and safety. Mr. Foster also makes Trusses for Prolapsus Uteri, which were improved in cases where pessaries have failed. Suspensory Trusses, Knee Caps and Back Board are always kept on hand. As a matter of convenience and not of speculation, the undersigned will keep on hand the following kinds from which you may select: Hall's; Read's Spiral Truss; Russell's do.; Salmon's ball and socket; Sherman's patent; French do.; Marsh's Improved Truss; Batesman's do., double and single; also Trusses for all sizes of children.

All kinds of Trusses repaired at short notice, and made as good as when new.

[?] Ladies, wishing for any of these instruments, will be waited upon by Mrs. Foster, at the establishment, where they have been engaged in the above business for ten years.

He likewise informs individuals he will not make their complaints known to any one, except when it is permitted to refer to them in the Journal of Health, and young people do not want their cases known.

JAMES FREDERICK POSTER.
Boston, June 13, 1845.

JUST PUBLISHED,

THOUGHTS ON THE DEATH PENALTY.

By Charles C. Burling. For sale by BELLA H. NASH, No. 25 Cornhill. Also at the "Journal of Health," No. 9, Vassar St.

A New Series, containing Bulwer's article entire, on Water Cure, with Notes by the Editor.

Nov. 21

POETRY.

A RALLYING CRY FOR NEW-ENGLAND,
AGAINST THE ANNEXATION OF
TEXAS.

BY JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL.

Rouse up, New-England! Buckle on your mail of
proof sublime,
Your stern old hate of tyranny, your deep contempt
of crime!
A traitor plot is hatching now, more full of woe and
shame
Than ever from the iron heart of bloodiest despot
came!
Six slave States added at a breath! One flourish of
a pen,
And fetters shall be riveted on millions more of men!
One drop of ink to sign a name, and Slavery shall
find,
For all her surplus flesh and blood, a market to her
mind!
A market where good Democrats their fellow-men
may sell!
Oh, what a grin of fiendish glee runs round and round
through hell!
How all the damned leap up for joy, and half forget
their fire,
To think men take such pains to claim the notice of
God's ire!
Is't not enough that we have borne the sneer of all
the world,
And bent to those whose haughty lips in scorn of us
are curled?
Is't not enough that we must hunt their living chattels
back,
And cheer the hungry blood-hounds on that howl
upon their track?
Is't not enough that we must bow to all that they de-
clare—
These cotton and tobacco lords, these pimps of sla-
very?
That we must yield our conscience up to glut Oppres-
sion's maw,
And break our faith with God to keep the letter of
Man's law?
But must we sit in silence by, and see the chain and
whip
Made firmer for all time to come in Slavery's bloody
grip?
Must we not only half the guilt and all the shame
endure,
But help to make our tyrant's throne of flesh and
blood secure?
If hand and foot we must be bound by deeds our fa-
thers signed,
And must be cheated, guiled and scorned, because
they too were blind,
Why, let them have their pound of flesh—for that is
in the bond—
But woe to them if they but take a half hair's breadth
beyond!
Is water running in our veins? Do we remember
still
Old Plymouth rock, and Lexington, and glorious Bun-
ker Hill?
The debt we owe our fathers' graves? And to the yet
unborn,
Whose heritage ourselves must make a thing of pride
or scorn?
Gray Plymouth rock hath yet a tongue, and Concord
is not dumb,
And voices from our fathers' graves, and from the
future come;
They call on us to stand our ground, they charge us
still to be
Not only free from chains ourselves, but foremost to
make free!
The homespun mail by mothers woven, that was so
freely met
The British steel, clothes hearts as warm with Pilgrim
virtues yet;
Come, brethren, up! Come, mothers, cheer your sons
once more to go
Forth to a nobler battle-field than with our olden
foe!
Come, grasp your ancient buckler, gird on your an-
cient sword,
Let Freedom be your bastion, your armor God's
heart:
Shout, 'God for our New-England!' and smite them
hip and thigh,
The cursed race of Amalek, whose armor is a lie!
They fight against the law of God, the sacred human
heart:
One charge from Massachusetts, and their counsels
fall apart!
Rock the old Cradle yet once more! Let Faneuil Hall
send forth
The anger of true-hearted men, the lightning of the
North!
Awake, New-England! While you sleep, the foe
advances their lines!
Already on your strong-hold's wall their bloody ban-
ner shines!
Awake! and hurl them back again in terror and de-
spair—
The time has come for earnest deeds—we've not a
man to spare!

ANOTHER RALLYING CRY.

BY J. R. LOWELL.

O, spirit of the noble Past, when the Old Bay State
was free,
When her soil was uncontaminated from Berkshire to
the sea,
When her sons beneath a foreign sky could answer
bold and loud
Of the land that held their fathers' bones within her
bosom proud;
O, for a moment wake again! Rise from thy ancient
sleep,
Where, in their waving seaweed shrouds, are swung
in dreamless sleep
Her tawny-visaged mariners within whatever nook
Old ocean with his moaning surge in farthest seas
hath shook;
Awake! Arise! O, come again, called up from every
spot,
Where the moss-grey headstones cluster round the
humble house of God,
Where rest the stern old Pilgrims, each little hamlet's
pride,
Now, for the first time, sleeping with no weapon by
their side!
O, come from where the same good blood, sworn foe
to slavery still,
Came oozing through the homespun frock on that
world-famous Hill,
And choked his voice, whose last faint prayer was
for his country's health,—
FROM BEING SLAVE OR MAKING SLAVE—GOD SAVE
THE COMMONWEALTH!
O, come from every battle-field, from every famous
scene,
Where any blood for Freedom shed hath made the
grass more green,
Where, if there be one darker spot and greener than
the rest,
It marks where Pilgrim blood hath flowed from a
Massachusetts breast!
Rouse! for the Massachusetts men are crowding
one and all,
To look at the CORPSE OF FREEDOM, where she lies
in Faneuil Hall!

Where she lies in her cradle stark and stiff, with
death-damps on her brow,
Though cravens would have us think her heart beat
never so strong as now!

From clanging forge, from humming mill, from work-
shop, and from loom,
From ploughing land and ploughing sea, from stu-
dent's lonely room,
They're coming with the will in their eyes, the Pu-
ritan-hearted men,—
At sound of their footsteps, the blood shall rush to
Freedom's cheek again!

Not now, as in the olden time, with braced-up hearts
they come,
While King-street echoes jarringly the roll of British
drum;
Not now prepared to grasp the sword, and snatch the
fire-lock down
From where it had hung since the old French war,
with dust and cobwebs brown;

They're coming but to speak one word, they're coming
but to say,
'Poor minions of the Tyrant's cause, your grovelling
hearts obey;
But, hear it North, and hear it South, and hear it
East and West,
WE WILL NOT HELP YOU BEND YOUR SLAVES! In
God's NAME WE PROTEST!'

And, though all other deeds of thine, dear Father-
land, should be
Washed out, like writing upon sand, by Time's en-
croaching sea,
That single word shall stand sublime, nor perish
with the rest,
'THOUGH THE WHOLE WORLD SANCTION SLAVERY, IN
GOD'S NAME WE PROTEST!'

If thou must stand alone, what then? the honor shall
be more;
But thou canst never stand alone, while Heaven
still arches o'er,
While there is a God to worship, a devil to be denied,
The good and true of every age stand with thee, side
by side!

Well, if it must be, stand alone! and stronger thou
wilt grow
With every coward that deserts to join the tyrant
foe.
Let wealth and trade and Empire go, for what the
dross is worth—
One man that stands for right outweighs the guilt of
all the Earth.

No, if the Old Bay State was sunk, and, as in days
of yore,
One single ship within her sides the hope of Free-
dom bore,
Run up again the pine-tree flag, and on the chainless
reef
That flag should mark, where'er it waved, the island
of the free!

TEXAS!

THE VOICE OF NEW-ENGLAND.

BY J. G. WHITTIER.

Up the hillside, down the glen,
Rouse the sleeping citizen,
Summon out the might of men!
Like a lion crouching low,
Like a night-storm rising slow,
Like the tread of unseen foe,
It is coming—it is nigh!
Stand your homes and altars by!
On your own free hearthstones die!
Clang the bells in all your spires:
On the gray hills of your fires,
Fling to heaven your signal fires,
Unto Berkshire's tallest peak,
Let the flaming heralds speak!
O, for God and Duty stand,
Heart to heart, and hand to hand,
Round the old graves of your land!
Whose shrines and altars now,
Whose to the yoke would bow,
Brand the craven on his brow.
We have only left us space
For a free and fearless race,
None for traitors false and base.
Like the angel's voice sublime,
Heard above a world of crime,
Crying of the end of Time,
In the proud ear of the South,
With one heart and with one mouth,
Utter Freedom's mighty oath:
'Make our union-bond a chain,—
We will snap its links in twain,
We will stand erect again!
Give us bright, though broken rays,
Rather than eternal haze,
Clouding o'er the full-orbed blaze.
Keep your land of sun and bloom,
Only leave to Freedom room
For her forge and plough and loom.
Take your slavery-blinded slaves,
Give us but our own free gales
Blowing on our thousand sails.
Live, as paupers, mean and vile,
On the fruits of unpaid toil,
Locusts of your glorious soil!
Live, if it be to dwell
In your tyrant citadel,
Mined beneath by fires of hell!
Our black hills shall bud and blow,
Vines our rocks shall overgrow,
Plenty in our valleys flow.
And, when vengeance lights your skies,
Hither shall you turn your eyes,
As the damned on Paradise!
We but ask our rocky strand,
Freedom's true and brother hand,
Freedom's brown and honest hand:
Valleys by the slave untrod,
And the pilgrims' rugged sod,
Blessed of our fathers' God!

ANNEXATION OF TEXAS.

BY W. B. TAPPAN.

If Slavery's foul and damning spot
Must here increase, like Ahab's cloud,
Blackening the firmament, till not
One star shall blaze upon the proud;
If thus, a spectacle of scorn
To nations, we're content,—let men
Lift up the condemned horn
Of infamy—admit her then!
But if the loud, indignant cry
Heard round the world, has power; if soon
Must hateful error drop and die,
And truth stand out to burning noon;
If down time's ages lives our land,
The best, the last retreat for men,
Her flag by Freedom's breezes fanned,—
Ye'll not—ye can't admit her, then!
Now is the time, and now is the hour;
Through our Republic's breadth and length,
From hill and dale, and town and tower,
Let answer go in Virtue's strength:
And peel far round the startling cry—
We, whose old fathers strove the blow,
We, who for freedom dare to die
In million voices thunder, NO!

THE REFORMATORY.

THE RIGHTS OF GOD.

WHENTHAM, NOV. 13, 1845.

DEAR BROTHER GARRISON:

I did not intend to make any reply to the friend
who objected to some of my positions in regard to the
right of God to take life, as I have already occupied
so much space in the Liberator; but I have understood
that many persons were very much shocked at my
assertions, and that some friends of the Liberator
were shocked at an article being admitted into its
columns; and I therefore beg leave to say a few
words in self-defence. First, my friend says, 'If
God has no right to take life, because a father has no
right to take a farm from his son which he has given
him, then God is bound to secure life to us, against
all casualties, &c. Is it so? Does a father insure
his son against all losses of his farm, by extravagance,
bad culture, robbery, or any other loss? Certainly
not; and yet he has no right to take it back, after hav-
ing given it to his son. But, to the subject—Has God
a right to take life? I say not—and, to prove it, the
great error of mankind is, that governments, thrones
and combinations have rights that individuals have
not—that 'might makes right,'—and although you
say, I separately, may not kill, steal and rob, yet the gov-
ernment may do these acts with impunity. Precisely
the same idea have those persons, who say man may
not kill, and yet God may. I cannot conceive of its
being right for God to do an act that it is morally
wrong for man to do. Is not God under law as well
as man? Is he seated on a high throne, far above all
responsibility, and accountable to no body, but per-
fectly at liberty to kill, slay and butcher, as may best
suit his option? I say, no. God is under law, as
much as we. I deny that he created the moral law:
it created him—or rather, made him what he is. He
is goodness, and goodness comes only by obedience
to law; and God obeyed the law, and became what
he is by obeying it. We are to imitate him, and if he
may kill, I see why we may not. The law is
above God, and he holds himself responsible to it. All
sentient beings are under law. This law is eter-
nal—never was erected, but always was. This is the
rule of right, and whoever transgresses it is a sinner.
God says himself—'Shall not the Judge of all the
earth do right?' It appears to me it is denying all
moral obligation, to say God may set aside his own
law, and kill when he pleases. If so, why may not a
Christian, when 'full of the Holy Ghost,' kill also?
And why did not Christ, who is called God, kill too?
Was he not God enough to do wrong? Must a man
become God, in order to have a right to do wrong?
God holds himself up as an example for us in every
respect; and as the stream can rise no higher than
its fountain, so it is in vain to expect a people to be
better than their God. If he may kill, they certainly
may too. This is a natural inference for them to
draw. I know it is said that 'God has perfect wis-
dom, and knows when it will do to take life, but man
has not, therefore he may not take life.' But I would
ask, if all the sin of life-taking consists in our not
taking it at right times and for right causes? We say,
man cannot take life in love. Why? Because it is
an injury in all cases. Well, if we cannot injure a
man in love, how can God, who is love itself, injure
a man? We shall have to take the ground, that kill-
ing is not always an injury, or else deny God's
right to kill. Well might it be said in this case, in
regard to God, 'Thou that predestinate, another shall
not steal, dost thou steal?' Thou that sayest a man
may not kill, dost thou kill? The only remaining
point then is, is it always an injury to kill? To de-
prive a man of his rights is injuring him. His rights
all depend upon his right to life. Take that away,
and what rights has he left? Then, unless you can
rob a man of his rights without injuring him, you
cannot kill him without injuring him. But if you can
rob a man of all his rights and not injure him,
you cannot injure him at all; for if you have de-
prived him of all his rights, what more can you do to
him? Can you make him any worse of what you have
no rights left? He is annihilated, as far as this world
is concerned, and you have done your best towards
him. But we are told not to injure a man, which
proves there is such a thing as injuring him; and if
we can injure a man, then it is injuring him to de-
prive him of all his rights; and if depriving him of
all his rights is injuring him, then killing him is, for
we have before proved that killing a man is depriving
him of all his rights; and if killing a man is injuring
him, then it is wrong for God to kill him, unless God
can do wrong; but we have before seen that God can
do no wrong, therefore God cannot rightfully kill
a man. *Quod erat demonstrandum.* Am I wrong in
this? If God is accountable, then he may not do
wrong. If killing is injurious, then it is wrong. If
it deprives a man of all his rights, then it is injuri-
ous, except by sophistry. God gives life. That is his
business, to create, not destroy; and he is pulling
down with one hand, what he is building up with
the other? O no. This is reserved for man. He alone
is destroying God's work, for God cannot destroy
himself. 'If,' says Christ, 'a house be divided
against itself, it shall not stand.' If God, then, is
killing and making alive also, he certainly is divided
against himself.

Yours for truth,

C. B. STEARNS.

NON-RESISTANCE.

FRIEND GARRISON:

There is no subject more important, more momen-
tous, or in which the well-being of our race is more
involved, than that of non-resistance; and it is, very
important that its advocates should be agreed, and
understand each other. It should be discussed, cal-
mly and dispassionately, and each weak brother and
sister should be allowed to inquire, and ask such
questions as the answers from those who are
stronger and better informed, may tend to enlighten
and establish. In hope of this, permit me to ask a few
questions relative to some points discussed at the last
annual meeting of the Society. One writer says, speaking
of the discussion there, 'Our President says, "a de-
graded man was assaulting a woman, in order to commit
a rape upon her, it was lawful to restrain him by force."
This writer (C. B. Stearns) seems to doubt
the accordance of such force with the true spirit of
Christian non-resistance. Is such the general view
taken by other brethren? How far does this idea ac-
cord with the golden rule? and how far would true
practical non-resistance allow the woman, thus as-
saulted, to repel the advances of that "degraded
man" by physical force? Would she not be justified
in defending herself to the extent of her strength?
Would brother Stearns advise her to submit quietly to
the violation of her person? Would he not consider
her accessory, at least, to the crime? and would he,
as professing that Christianity requires him to love
his neighbor as himself, look on and permit such an
outrage, when the strength of his own arm could
prevent it? I do not say that physical restraint can,
in any case, prevent crime, for the crime is in the motive,
the determination to commit it. By restraining him
forcibly, we do not lessen his guilt, but shield another
from suffering wrong, and do him, at least, no injury.
Is there anything unchristian in this? I am a woman,
and I want brother Stearns to answer me these
few simple questions.

RHODA.

A healthy climate and a fertile soil are the two
fundamental desiderata to be sought for and provided
as means in laying out the ground-work for a model
Association. Where the atmosphere inhaled is sick-
ly, repeated discouragement will tend but to disperse
the settlers;—where the air is bracing, the spirits will
be keen, the movement nimble, and industry more
productive.

Hill and dale, wood and water, all lying as much
possible within a ring-fence, constitute, it is under-

stood, the essential elements of real beauty in every
picturesque landscape. These accessories should
therefore be consulted, at once to gratify the taste as
well as to promote utility; and where they are not
actually existing, are frequently susceptible of being ar-
tificially introduced. Care must also be exercised in
selecting the advantages of an arid and a water
power—the eminence of the former to serve in the
construction of a wall-mill; the current of the latter
to propel the machinery of the work-shops. It is as-
sumed that one object with every Association will be
to endeavor to raise within itself either the means of
its own subsistence, or an equivalent—the wheat,
where practicable, or barter as its substitute, where-
ver the geological structure of the soil is unfavor-
able to the production of that particular species of
grain. Hence the necessity of a mill situated on the
most elevated position of the estate, and impelled by
sails, for the purpose of grinding and manufacturing
its flour. The design, in view of raising a supply ad-
equate to all the wants of the establishment, is based
upon the nicest calculations of policy. It supposes
the solution of a most interesting problem now be-
fore the world, viz: that wherever Associations ex-
ist, there can be no want; and establishes the posi-
tion, that to the evils of poverty all other similar in-
stitutions present a most effectual antidote. Let ev-
ery phalanx provide an amount requisite for the con-
sumption of its own members, and it will soon be dis-
covered who are the producers, and who are the con-
sumers. It is not too much to assert, that as a con-
sequence, penury will be restricted to precise and
definite limits—its character and causes will be more
distinctly ascertained, and the proper remedies more
understandingly applied.

With respect to the agencies to be employed—
those of wind and water, wherever practicable, it is to
be observed that to identify men with nature, as
far as possible, with all their operations, is to act in
harmony with its laws. The elements of which we
ourselves are composed, are but so many developments
of sympathetic power around us, administering to the
aid, the comfort and the necessities of our race. But
how shall we employ them for the purposes of associa-
tion? In having recourse to air, we spare the use
of the water. In having recourse to water, we spare
the exercise of fire. Both economy and simplicity
demand, in certain cases, a preference sometimes of
the one, and sometimes of the other—steam, as a
caloric, being more expensive in its application than
either.

Looking at the intentions of nature, and coupling
them with the distribution of its energies, oftentimes
latent, we are led to infer, that the more nearly we
conform to organic principles in our arrangements—the
mountain and the water-fall—the more shall we
harmonize with the eternal springs of action which
ally us to the Godhead, from whom they are de-
rived.

From the Western Citizen.

CONFESSION AND EXECUTION OF THE MUR-
DERS.

ROCK ISLAND, OCT. 25, 1845.

MR. EDITOR:

I hasten to lay before your readers an account of
the horrible tragedy just enacted here. John Long,
Aaron Long, and Granville Young, have this morn-
ing been hung according to law, for the murder
of Col. Geo. Davenport. Although the morning
was a rainy one, an immense concourse of people
were assembled from every part of the country;
and at the time of execution, I made an es-
timate, and should judge there were five thousand
present—a promiscuous assemblage of men, women
and children.

At 11 o'clock, the guard formed in a hollow
square, before the jail, and marched to the gallows,
where they were dismissed until dinner. Music by
the Green Mountain Boys, composed by them for
the occasion. At 1 o'clock, the guards again
formed in front of the jail, when the prisoners were
brought out, and conducted in solemn procession,
by the sheriff, to the gallows. The prisoners
were seated on the gallows, while the pris-
oners ascended the scaffold and took their seats
by the sheriff. Several other gentlemen also ac-
crued the scaffold. I say other gentlemen, for the
prisoners appeared very much like gentlemen.
They were well dressed, and up to this time, scarce-
ly any emotion was visible in their countenances.
But after sitting awhile, a slight paleness seemed to
overshadow their faces, as they looked upon the
apparatus before them. Strange would it be if their
hearts did not sink in that hour. The sheriff ad-
vanced and read the order for their execution; after
which, he remarked that if the prisoners wished to
say anything, opportunity was given. John Long
then arose, (the sheriff having unbound the cords
from his arms), and advancing forward, made a very
polite bow, and addressed the audience as follows:
I give the substance of what he said, avoiding his
repetitions, and correcting his language, which
was sometimes ungrammatical, and other-
wise incorrect:

Ladies and Gentlemen of this respectable audience—
I appear before you as a dying man, about to be
launched into eternity, and request that you will lis-
ten to what I have to say, before I leave this world
forever. Myself, my brother Aaron, and my friend,
Granville Young, you see before you about to be
hung for the murder of Col. Geo. Davenport. I
now say to you, gentlemen, and I wish you to re-
member, that we are innocent of the crime. I wish
you to receive this as the dying declaration of a
man. (Here he became much affected.) I now
tell you, gentlemen, that Robert Birch, William Fox,
Theodore Brown and myself committed that mur-
der—though we killed Mr. Davenport unintentionally—and I wish the people of Rock Island distinct-
ly to understand and depend upon it, that no other
person is guilty of that crime, either as accessory
before or after the fact, and every other man who
is hung for that crime is hung innocent. As for me,
gentlemen, I do not fear to die, the fear of
death was never before my eyes; but I cannot leave
this world, and leave behind me a man, that I
see two innocent men hung. Look at the evi-
dence against Aaron amounts to nothing at all. There
was not the slightest evidence, excepting what was
given by Birch, and I do not believe there is a man
that believes my voice, who does not believe that
Birch perjured himself. The groceryman testi-
fied that Aaron bought bread there, but when he
came to look at him, he said he thought the man
who bought the bread was two or three inches taller.
So you see what amounts to. As to Granville
Young, upon whose evidence we are convicted? Is
Mr. Bonny here? (Here he looked for some time
among the crowd.) (Mr. Bonny) I have no request
that he step forward. (He was told Mr. Bonny
was absent.) Well, then, if Mr. Bonny is
not here, it knocks out 650 pages from my speech.
That man Bonny has been held up before you, gen-
tlemen, as one of the best men that ever lived. But
I now tell you that he is the chief among thieves
and robbers, and was necessary both before and af-
ter the fact to the murder of Miller. You may
apply to Dr. Williams and Mr. Loomis, as witnesses
to that fact. I leave you for the present, gen-
tlemen, and let my friends speak for themselves.
I will be before you again. I will then tell you why
I make this confession. (Here he thanked the au-
dience for their attention, and retired.)

Aaron Long then came forward and said:
I am about to be hung for a crime of which I am
innocent. I always lived at home with my parents,
and always worked hard. Last summer, I went
down to Nauvoo with John and I suppose he
saw Fox, and the rest, and they wanted him to go
up and help John Davenport, and the only difficulty
was to get John separated from me. So Fox said
he wanted to do some business up the river, and
must take John along as a witness. So they went
up, and left me at Nauvoo. I am as innocent of
this crime as the farthest man in England. When
I was in Nauvoo, I gave him all the notes I
had against men in Indiana, and he gave me all his
against men about here. I am entirely innocent of
the murder. I have nothing more to say.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

You behold me about to be launched into eter-
nity. (The prisoner was much affected, and it was
with difficulty he spoke.) I am about to be hung
for the murder of Col. Davenport. I am innocent

of that crime. I am to be hung on the testimony of
Mr. Bonny. He says he saw me on the 14th of Aug.
and that I, a perfect stranger, approached him, and
told him that I knew who the murderers of Daven-
port were, and offered to join them. Does it look
likely that a stranger would approach him in that
way? No. It is said that Bonny's name ought
to be written in letters of gold on the corners of the
streets; but I think it should be written with the
blood of innocent men. I became acquainted with
Ed. Bonny about 12 months ago, and previous to
that time, I had led an innocent life. He was the
man who first induced me to commit crime. I leave
this matter with you. I am willing that God should
be my judge.

Having taken his seat, John Long again advanced
and addressed the audience:

Gentlemen and Ladies:
My friends have made quite short speeches. I
will now state why I came up here, and I did with a
confession of this affair. While I lay in my dungeon
chained down with my fellow prisoners, I could
hear, on the one side the most awful curses, and
on the other I could hear these men who are now on
the scaffold, calling on God to have mercy on them,
and asserting their innocence. Could I endure
that? No, gentlemen, I knew that they were in-
nocent, and I was guilty; and I determined to tell
the truth about the matter. I did so. I wrote a
confession, showing the innocence of these men,
but it was not permitted to be published. Why was
this? The people here did not want those abroad
to know that they were going to hang innocent
men.

Would to God that my three accomplices in guilt
stood beside me instead of these two innocent men.
How can you consent to let two men be hung for a
crime of which they are innocent? It is your duty
to take these two men from the scaffold, and rescue
them from an unmerited death. I tell you, gentle-
men, that what I say is true, and I feel it my duty
to stand up here as long as I have a voice to live,
and attest to the innocence of these men—
(Here he shed tears and showed much feeling; as
he invariably did, whenever he alluded to his brother-
er.) My brother has never, to my knowledge,
wronged a man out of a penny in his life. He has
always given me good advice. So have my
parents, and I was guilty; and I determined to tell
the truth about the matter. I did so. I wrote a
confession, showing the innocence of these men,
but it was not permitted to be published. Why was
this? The people here did not want those abroad
to know that they were going to hang innocent
men.

There has been a great deal of excitement against
us in this place, and I have no doubt if there had
been some one to take the lead and say 'come on,
boys, the jail would have been torn down, and all
should have been murdered. This took spirit
from the crowd, and they were not so ready to
murder. This was what first set Fox to robbing. He
was taken, shot and whipped in company with
another, for a crime of which he was innocent.
This rendered him desperate. Fox is a man of a
feeling heart, one who lives up to his profession;
and if ever he is brought here upon the scaffold,
he will say these men were innocent, and that he
was here now, he would offer himself in their
stead.

Behold me—a dying man—a dead man. And my
dying words are, that these men are innocent. I
here hold up my hands and invoke the heavens to
witness that these men are innocent. Would that
God himself would come down and convince the
audience of the truth of what I say. You are about
to behold, my friends, a sight which I hope you
may never behold again—two innocent men hung.
As for myself, gentlemen, I do not know what will
be my fate—whether I am entirely ignorant. All my
hopes lie between this moment and that, (pointing
to the rope.) Should I make a full confession, I
should implicate 300 men in this State, Indiana,
Missouri, and Territory. Perhaps some of you
think it is my duty, but I do not, for I have some
feeling for their families. I have confessed about
Bonny. I make no other confessions. (Here he
closed his very lengthy speech, lifting up his hands,
and asserting with his last words the innocence of
the men by his side.)

After he had closed, he returned to his seat, and
saw the other prisoners, returned, and stated that
it was their dying request that their bodies be
given to their friends, and not to the physicians.
Mr. Gatchell now stepped forward and offered
up a short and appropriate prayer; after
which, Mr. Haney read a Psalm. The prisoners
were severely shook down and convinced the
audience of the truth of what I say. You are about
to behold, my friends, a sight which I hope you
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Mr. Gatchell now stepped forward and offered
up a short and appropriate prayer; after
which, Mr. Haney read a Psalm. The prisoners
were severely shook down and convinced the
audience of the truth of what I say. You are about
to behold, my friends, a sight which I hope you
may never behold again—two innocent men hung.
As for myself, gentlemen, I do not know what will
be my fate—whether I am entirely ignorant. All my
hopes lie between this moment and that, (pointing
to the rope.) Should I make a full confession, I
should implicate 300 men in this State, Indiana,
Missouri, and Territory. Perhaps some of you
think it is my duty, but I do not, for I have some
feeling for their families. I have confessed about
Bonny. I make no other confessions. (Here he
closed his very lengthy speech, lifting up his hands,
and asserting with his last words the innocence of
the men by his side.)

After he had closed, he returned to his seat, and
saw the other prisoners, returned, and stated that
it was their dying request that their bodies be
given to their friends, and not to the physicians.
Mr. Gatchell now stepped forward and offered
up a short and appropriate prayer; after
which, Mr. Haney read a Psalm. The prisoners
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